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Costly encounters of the empathic kind: a typology 
Naomi Head1 
 
Abstract 
While considerable attention is being accorded to emotions in International Relations, this 
article seeks to integrate empathy into these interdisciplinary debates. It counters the 
dominant assumption that empathy tends to be largely benign and beneficial by 
conceptualising a typology of the costs of empathy. The dimensions of costs addressed are: 
epistemological, cognitive, emotional, material, and embodied. I argue that these costs are 
frequently tangible for those who make the ethical-political choice to engage in empathy in 
situations of conflict and political violence. Drawing on social psychology approaches, 
empathy is located within a framework of collective narratives, emotions, and social 
structures shaped by both micro- and macro- political processes. A model of empathy, 
which acknowledges social influences and the psychological mechanisms through which 
these influences may be mediated, contributes to a deeper understanding of how politics, 
psychology, and culture shape empathy and, crucially, helps understand the conditions 
which may affect the successes, limitations and failures of empathy in the (international) 
political sphere. The article offers empirical illustrations of the costs of empathy drawing on 
examples from Israel and Palestine. 
 
Key words: Empathy; Emotions; Israel/Palestine; Micro-politics; Narrative; Conflict 
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Introduction 
While considerable attention has been accorded to emotions in International Relations (IR) 
in recent debates, this article seeks to build on the debates on emotion by drawing 
attention to the questions at stake when we seek to theorise empathy in IR.  The 18th 
century saw the spread of empathy, or sympathy, in novels, plays, and public discourse 
(Reddy 2009: 306-9).  While it may be relatively easy to empathise with characters in a play 
at the theatre, it is far more challenging to empathise with members of an out-group under 
conditions of (protracted) conflict.  Interpersonal dynamics play an important role at all 
levels of politics, including in the international sphere where the generation of empathy, 
trust, mistrust and other ‘affective relations’ (Pedwell 2014) between states rest, in part, on 
the complex cognitive and emotional relationships between diplomats, leaders and 
representatives (Holmes  2013; Yarhi-Milo 2013). As such, the significance of empathy – its 
                                                          
1 Politics, University of Glasgow. Email: Naomi.head@glasgow.ac.uk.  Article accepted 9 November 
2015.   
 
 
2 
 
relations of power, costs, meanings and practices - should not be ignored as the navigation 
of beliefs, values, interests, and narratives remain as important to the construction of 
international politics as to national or community politics.   
The difficulties faced by ‘empathy entrepreneurs’2 in particular call for an 
interrogation of what the costs of engaging in empathy might be in order to understand 
when actors may engage in empathy and the social and political structures and processes 
which constrain them.3  A framework which acknowledges both social influences and the 
psychological mechanisms through which these influences may be mediated, contributes to 
a deeper understanding of how politics, psychology, and culture shape empathy and 
crucially, therefore, helps understand the conditions which may shape the successes, 
limitations and failures of empathy in the political sphere.  While it may be unsurprising to 
many within IR that empathy is hard to find in conflicts, it is nonetheless necessary to 
understand the dynamics which block empathy if it is to be able to contribute to sustainable 
transformations of conflict through re-humanising the other and providing mutual insights 
to the other’s needs and beliefs as it is often characterised in the conflict resolution 
literature (Deutsch 2006:65; Broome 1993; Rothman 1992; Galtung 2004; Staub 2011; 
Cameron, Weatherbed 2014). 
In order to elaborate on what the costs of empathy may be and to make the case for 
the relevance of this for international politics, I make two conceptual links in the argument 
that follows.  First, I draw on the social psychology approach which informs Daniel Bar-Tal’s 
socio-psychological infrastructure (2007, 2013). As Herbert Kelman and other social 
psychologists working on conflict have noted, psychological processes constitute and 
mediate much of the behaviour located within the international sphere (2007: 62).  Bar-Tal’s 
framework offers resources for exploring direct and indirect forms of power which enable 
and constrain the possibilities for empathy as well as highlighting the group dynamics which 
are key to generating the costs of empathy.  Second, I engage with the sociologically-
informed debate on micro- and macro- approaches to political processes (Hutchison and 
Bleiker 2014; Linklater 2014; Ross 2014; Kelman 2007).  I contend that the socio-
psychological infrastructure creates a normative and emotional climate within and between 
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groups and societies setting the background against which the transgression of these norms 
through empathic behaviour may exact costs at a micro level.  While such costs may be ‘felt’ 
primarily at the individual level, their connection to social norms, identities, beliefs, and 
political ideologies also ensures that they are entwined in wider structural and political 
relations.   
The re-framing of IR’s discrete ‘levels of analysis’ as a micro-macro approach to 
politics ensures that research on empathy is not relegated solely to the interpersonal sphere 
(and therefore marginalised within IR as a discipline which has traditionally focused on state 
phenomena) but is imbricated in the structural and agentic relations of both individuals and 
collectives at all levels.  Indeed, as Andrew Ross has noted, ‘contemporary microsociologists 
[suggest] that all structures at the macro-level involve micro-level patterns of action’ 
(2014:35).  The challenges faced at a micro level by individuals and communities as a result 
of the societal norms and structures understood through a socio-psychological framework 
contribute to an explanation of the failure of empathy to have a wider and more sustained 
impact at a macro level under conditions of protracted conflict.   
 The article will set out the relevant conceptual frames for empathy, the socio-
psychological infrastructure, and the case for engaging with both micro- and macro- 
processes.  Having clarified the theoretical framework which facilitated the identification of 
these costs, the article will propose a typology consisting of five main types of cost: 
epistemological, cognitive, emotional, material, and embodied.  Examples of these types of 
cost are developed in the final section in relation to the case of Israel and Palestine.  
Coupled with existing scholarly research on inter-group conflict, the empirical data I 
collected through interviewing approximately twenty Israelis and Palestinians4 working with 
non-violent approaches to the conflict at the grassroots and civil society level in Israel and 
the West Bank revealed a number of experiences illustrative of the micro-politics of 
empathy and the costs identified in the typology.5  Focusing on the lived experiences of 
empathy at a micro-level allows these threads to be woven into a more complex picture of 
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micro-macro relations of conflict engendered by group dynamics and the socio-
psychological infrastructure.6  The typology offers a capacity to interrogate how and why 
empathy is costly in cases of conflict beyond the present empirical focus on Israel and 
Palestine.  A focus on relevant political and psychological dynamics contributes to a stronger 
understanding of the challenges facing empathy and its entrepreneurs in international 
politics if empathy is indeed to work for sustainable peace and social justice.7   
Israel and Palestine is an appropriate case to draw on to support and illustrate a 
theorisation of the costly dimension of empathy for several reasons.  First, the considerable 
extant research on the narratives of conflict in the region, the emotional, psychological, 
political and cultural mechanisms through which they are perpetuated, and the 
consequences this has for social and political relations are all relevant for developing 
conceptual and analytical approaches for other protracted conflicts in international 
relations.  Second, the extensive inter-disciplinary academic and policy focus on resolution 
and reconciliation processes that has developed around this conflict frequently recognises 
the need for empathy – either implicitly or explicitly - but focuses less on theorising its limits 
and contingencies.  Third, the degree to which the conflict is interwoven with the structures, 
institutions, discourse and policies of international actors draws attention to the need to 
reconfigure our ways of thinking about levels of analysis in IR given the salience of 
emotions, empathy and narratives at the micro and macro level for the perpetuation, 
potential transformation, and analysis of the conflict. 
Defining empathy: walking a few miles in the shoes of the other  
Four psychological states have been identified which are helpful for establishing a suite of 
capacities called empathy and for recognizing the complex relationship between cognition 
and emotion which characterises empathy (Batson and Ahmad 2009).  The 
cognitive/perceptual states identified are: 1) Imagine-self perspective (imagining how one 
would think and feel in another’s situation), and 2) Imagine-other perspective (imagining 
how another person thinks or feels given his/her situation – also characterised as cognitive 
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perspective-taking).  The affective/emotional states identified are: 3) Emotion matching 
(feeling as another person feels), and 4) Empathic concern (feeling for another person who 
is in need – this is also commonly characterized in the literature as sympathy) (Batson and 
Ahmad 2009: 144).  These categorisations of cognitive-emotional activities, which fall under 
the broad umbrella of empathy, also reflect the emergence of distinctions between 
empathy, compassion/sympathy, and emotional contagion.  Emotional contagion is an 
automatic response to the emotions of others which is experienced at an early stage of 
human development before babies have learnt to differentiate between themselves and 
others (Frevert 2011: 150).  While sympathy, like compassion, implies a ‘pro-social, 
cooperative and benevolent attitude towards the other person’ (Frevert 2011: 178), 
empathy does not inevitably require any positive regard for the other (White 1984: 9).  
Indeed, Martha Nussbaum has noted that a torturer may use empathy for ‘hostile and 
sadistic ends’ (2001: 333).    
This broader set of empathic-related capacities can also be defined as the ‘art of 
stepping imaginatively into the shoes of another person, understanding their feelings and 
perspectives, and using that understanding to guide your actions’ (Krznaric 2014: x).  This 
type of definition serves more than one meaning of empathy.  It embraces a broader, 
philosophical, definition of perspective-taking which may be morally neutral and which is 
essential to all forms of social interaction, whether cooperative or conflictual, as well as 
empathy in the normative sense which implies some form of positive identification with the 
feelings of others.  It is the latter meaning with which we are currently concerned; while 
cognitive perspective-taking is largely unavoidable, it does not precipitate the same degree 
of normative interest in the well-being of others.   
The case for focusing on the costs of empathy emerges from the normative 
narratives of empathy often found in the peacebuilding, development, psychological, and 
political literatures (Pedwell 2012, 2013; Crawford 2002, 2014; Marlier and Crawford 2013; 
Staub 2011; Monroe 2012; Kelman 1996, 1999; Nussbaum 2002; Baron-Cohen 2011; Bar-Tal 
2013; Halperin, Sharvit, and Gross, 2011; Morrell 2010) which tend to assume that 
exercising empathy, although far from easy, is largely beneficial in the long-term for the 
parties involved as it may lead to reconciliation, conflict resolution, deliberative democracy, 
or practices of global governance.  This normative orientation to promoting the well-being 
of others is captured by Neta Crawford’s argument that ‘Increasing the capacity for empathy 
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is likely one of, if not the most important, routes to peace and justice’ (2014: 544).  In 
parallel policy terms, President Barack Obama voiced much the same sentiment in his 
address to the United Nations General Assembly, when he said in relation to Israel and 
Palestine that ‘the deadlock will only be broken when each side learns to stand in the 
other’s shoes; each side can see the world through the other’s eyes’ (2011).   
This normative approach to empathy seeks to expand the boundaries of our moral 
concern (Krznaric 2014: xxi), to extend compassion towards vulnerable others, to encourage 
pro-social behaviour, to contribute to social cohesion, reconciliation and ‘humanising’ 
processes, and to develop ethical deliberative capacities (Morrell 2010).  This approach 
usually attributes universal recognition to other human beings as fellow humans (Appiah 
2006; Nussbaum 2002; Linklater 2007; Staub 2011) and challenges tendencies to objectify 
others in order to exclude or act violently against them in some manner.  Even Martha 
Nussbaum, who assigns a neutral value to empathy, recognises that it involves a ‘basic 
recognition of another world of experience, and to that extent it is not altogether neutral’ 
(2001: 333).  In other words, the failure to recognise the humanity of others is a deeper kind 
of evil even than empathy used for hostile ends.  As Ervin Staub summarises, ‘[k]nowing 
adversaries so as to accurately take their perspective, understanding their concerns and 
needs, and empathizing with them enables people to work on resolving conflict and 
overcoming hostility’ (2011: 328).  It is, he suggests, a key component to humanising others 
(2011).  Similarly, mediators Giandomenico Picco and Gabrielle Rifkind have declared that 
‘empathy – which is not appeasement – is an essential component of the art of 
peacemaking because entering into the mind of the enemy increases the possibility of 
resolving conflict’ (2014: 7).  Empathy is also often accorded a moral dimension, as it 
articulates a crucial element of an ethics of political community and questions the extent of 
our moral and ethical obligations to distant and unknown others (Slote 2007; Koehn 1998; 
Habermas and Dews, 1992: 269).  While such a normative and ethical account of empathy is 
extremely valuable, this literature neglects explicit attention to the costs which attend such 
empathic behaviour, particularly for empathy entrepreneurs.  The aim of this article is to 
demonstrate how it is frequently costly for those who make the ethical-political choice8 to 
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engage in empathy in situations of conflict and political violence and, in doing so, to develop 
a typology of costs which has wider applicability for the study of empathy in international 
politics.  
Socio-psychological infrastructure 
I argue that the socio-psychological infrastructure (Bar-Tal 2007; 2013) – the 
institutionalisation and perpetuation of a collection of shared narratives, memories, 
emotions, attitudes, and beliefs – may be both an obstacle and an aid to the development 
of empathic encounters.  While intractable conflict and existential threat remain the 
dominant narrative of a society there is little room for collective empathy to emerge within 
the discourses of the public sphere and the challenges associated with transgressing these 
norms of hostility towards others and the associated negative emotions may be high.  
Conversely, through processes of resolution, reconciliation and political change, shifts in the 
socio-psychological infrastructure may contribute to a greater capacity for individual and 
collective empathy.9  This framework, which provides the scaffolding for any interpersonal 
or intergroup encounter in conflict (at a micro- or macro- level), is comprised of three 
elements: collective memories, an ethos of conflict, and collective emotional orientations 
(2007: 1435; 2013).10  These three elements contribute to the formation and consolidation 
of a strong social identity that provides individuals with the security, support, sense of 
belonging, and national coordination necessary to cope with the conflict situation (2007: 
1443).   
Taking each of these three components in turn, collective memory is constructed 
through narratives which represent the past as it is remembered, interpreted, and 
reconstructed by members of society as the history of the group (Bar-Tal 2013: 137).  Along 
with shared societal beliefs, collective memory ‘provides an epistemic foundation for the 
group’s belonging, solidarity, existence, [identity,] mobilization, and courses of action’ 
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(2013: 138).  Shared societal beliefs play a key role in organizing, integrating, and orienting 
the majority of society members through their dominant presence in the public, political, 
cultural and educational spheres.  The themes of societal beliefs, which underpin an ethos 
of conflict include: ‘the justness of one’s own goals, opponent delegitimization, self-
victimhood, positive self-image, security, patriotism, unity, and peace’ (Bar-Tal 2013: 174-5).  
These themes loom large in the dominant Israeli and Palestinian narratives (see Hammack 
2011) as well as other examples of conflict in international relations. 
As some societal beliefs secure a hegemonic position, they serve to underpin the 
collective emotional orientation of a society.  They may evoke emotions, define the lens 
through which information regarding the conflict and the other is interpreted, and define 
(il)legitimate ways of expression for those emotions (Bar-Tal 2007: 1435; 2013: 213-4).  A 
collective emotional orientation is shaped in part by the ‘feeling rules’ embedded within 
particular societies.  Arlie Hochschild noted that a feeling rule denotes which emotions are 
appropriate or expected in particular situations (von Scheve 2012: 4).  Feeling rules are, 
therefore, ‘a subset of prescriptive social norms that…demarcate the intensity, direction, 
duration, and objects of emotions appropriate in a situation’ (von Scheve 2012: 4).  Just as 
social norms guide behaviour, so too feeling rules guide emotions and their regulation.  Such 
normative regulation supports and sustains beliefs about the ‘other’, justifies violent or 
aggressive responses in particular situations towards the out-group, and generally serves to 
shape the emotional perception of the other in ways which align with the needs of societies.  
The more ‘sacred’ the belief or identity is to a particular society, the more mobilized the 
group is likely to be to protect it, the more emotional commitment is likely to circulate 
within the group and the greater the likelihood of shared negative emotions towards the 
out-group.  Under such circumstances, empathising with the other group’s equally sacred 
beliefs is likely to trigger retribution in some form and/or pressure to conform to the 
hegemonic belief.  Entrenched collective emotional dispositions towards groups, individuals, 
or symbols are likely to inhibit empathy, as well as creating greater difficulties for empathy 
entrepreneurs, especially as they may be triggered through socialisation and memory rather 
than solely through direct experience.11   
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Much of what blocks the capacity or willingness to empathise with the other in 
situations of conflict stems from the collective narratives of groups, the membership of 
‘ingroups’ (and associated biases) and the construction of superiority over ‘outgroups’ and 
the perceptions attached to these modes of history and social identity (Siniver 2012; 
Hammack 2011; Bar-Tal 2007, 2013; Maoz, Steinberg, Bar-On and Fakhereldeen 2002; 
McDoom 2012).  Consequently, each group is likely to ‘incorporate the historical facts within 
its own cognitive schema of the conflict’ (Rouhana 2004: 42).  These master narratives12 are 
important for reflecting on the costs of empathic encounters because they articulate the 
degree to which such behaviour is likely to challenge societal norms and beliefs. 
Recent work in process sociology and IR complements the contributions of social 
psychology in terms of understanding how emotions may interact with beliefs to shape 
group identity and behaviour and, therefore, impact our willingness or ability to engage in 
empathic interactions.  Simon Koschut has written that 
 
emotional knowledge forms part of asymmetries of power and status in which 
‘established’ groups secure the compliance of outsiders.  Insiders maintain 
and reproduce a particular self-image of social superiority vis-à-vis outsiders 
based on group charisma and emotional knowledge (feelings of social 
superiority/pride).  At the same time, established groups persuade outsiders 
to internalize feelings of social inferiority (shame) through emotional rigidity, 
stigmatization, and by placing the contact of insiders with outsiders under a 
taboo (2014: 541). 
 
Such asymmetries of power and status shape which voices get heard and which narratives 
are accepted or marginalised.  Operating not only at a discursive level, such asymmetries 
also impact on the constitution of political power at an institutional level. 
The constitution of empathy, as with emotions, is not reducible to the biological or 
neuroscientific processes of the individual, as individuals are always embedded in social 
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contexts.  These contexts shape whether empathy is likely to be expressed, how it may be 
expressed, and by and for whom (Demertzis 2013: 6).  Empathy requires that ‘we connect 
the process in the micro-level to the process in the macro-level.  So people see that it is not 
other people that are responsible but me and you and you and you that are creating this 
dynamic in the conflict’ (Interview with Sonnenschein, 2014).  This recognition of focused 
responsibility embraces the complex micro- and macro- dynamics between the beliefs, 
behaviour, and values of the individual, the structures and discourses of societies, and the 
policies of governments; all aspects reflected in the socio-psychological infrastructure.  The 
adoption of the distinction between micro and macro politics has increasingly shaped the 
emotions debates in IR as well as elsewhere.  Nicolas Demertzis has noted in relation to the 
analysis of emotions that 
 
the micro level concerns the intrapersonal dimensions of emotive life, the 
meso level corresponds to social interaction in groups, institutions, everyday 
encounters and the emotional dynamic therein, whereas the macro level 
entails norms, rules, law, traditions and socio-economic structures which 
provide the ‘path dependency’ for emotional cultures and social emotions to 
be formed (2013: 8).   
 
In other words, the multiple layers of emotional life, from the individual to the international, 
are interlinked.  The preceding discussion of the socio-psychological infrastructure 
demonstrates the significance of the dominant emotional climate, norms and beliefs of 
society for the formation of a micro-politics of empathy.  Making a parallel argument in 
relation to emotions, Demertzis notes that ‘[a]s they are distributed in time and space, 
norms function as an instance of the macro reality; internalized by the subjects qua beliefs 
and goals they are rendered an instance of microreality’ (2013: 8).   
Consequently, collective emotional orientations of societies affect not just the 
decision-making and interpretative processes of individuals but they also animate the policy 
process through the assessment of threats, the construction of security discourses, 
decisions on military spending, defense, foreign policy, and so on (Crawford 2013: 123; 
Saurette 2006).  This link between micro- and macro-politics is implicit in Paul Saurette’s 
writings which chart the relationship between perceptions of humiliation as a central 
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emotional force of an individual – former President George W. Bush – to humiliation as a 
structuring dynamic of post-9/11 global politics.  Similar arguments with regards to the 
political status of individually experienced emotions – notably humiliation, betrayal and 
their often violent consequences – have been made by, among others, Richard Jackson 
(2014) and Khaled Fattah and K. M. Fierke (2009).  Their respective writings on the ‘war on 
terror’ demonstrate the way in which master narratives (and collective emotional 
orientations therein) of the self and other relationship influence and shape the process of 
identity formation, the personal and political decisions of ‘ordinary’ people and their 
leaders, and their propensity for empathy towards out-groups.  Individual experiences of 
humiliation, shame and violence have been interpreted through the lens of broader 
historical narratives of trauma, betrayal and humiliation and this has shaped the multiple, 
interdependent and complex layers of intractable conflict that former President Bush called 
the ‘global war on terrorism’.  The resulting emotional climate created through the socio-
psychological infrastructure creates further barriers to empathy at both the micro and 
macro levels.  The extensive array of existing political, educational, and cultural socio-
psychological mechanisms support the wider argument concerning the need to move away 
from discrete levels of analysis towards an approach which examines how macro- and 
micro- politics are interwoven.  The micro-politics of empathy point to the complex 
processes through which macro-political structures and ideologies are contested, 
negotiated and filtered. 
A Typology of the costs of empathy: theory and practice 
In line with its oft-cited normative benefits, empathy is often presented as an inhibitor of 
aggressive behaviour and a contributing factor in preventing people from committing acts of 
violence against others (Baron-Cohen, 2011; Staub 2011: 327; Moses 1985).  As will be clear 
from the preceding discussion this claim should be mediated by recognising that 
membership of in-groups and out-groups (and their associated identities) is likely to shape 
any empathic process.  In other words, empathy with fellow members of the in-group – and 
the consequent strengthening of collective identity - may serve to block or limit the 
empathy shown towards members of the out-group and contribute to dynamics of conflict.  
Empathy is not, therefore, an emotion per se, but a process which can trigger a wide range 
of emotions.  Empathy oriented towards fellow members of the in-group as a result of 
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‘terrorist’ actions against them has, for example, triggered negative emotions and justified 
harmful behaviours – torture, rendition, human rights abuses, targeted killings - towards 
those perceived to be in out-groups.   
It is a widely recognised phenomenon of group dynamics that members of a group 
may police others within the group.  Ron Aminzade and Doug McAdam capture this 
essential dynamic and it is worth quoting them at length:  
 
all such groups – informal no less than formal – provide bedrock identity and 
other ontological benefits to their members.  The fact that they do affords 
these groups some considerable leverage with which to shape the actions of 
those individuals who hope to retain the various solidary benefits that come 
with group membership.  In other words, once the process of “social 
appropriation” has taken place and the group has committed itself to 
collective action, anyone resisting the new definition runs the risk of losing 
the mix of member benefits associated with participation in the group.  To the 
extent that the group, and its associated collective identity, has become an 
integral part of the individual’s life and self-identity, the kind of enduring 
“affective emotions” mentioned by Jasper (1998), such as fear of rejection 
and ostracism, can be a powerful force for conformity to the new behavioural 
and attitudinal requirements of group membership (2001: 37). 
 
This component of group dynamics – whereby some group members police others – clearly 
speaks to the argument that empathy with members of the out-group, wherein group 
boundaries, norms, beliefs and identities may be transgressed, could have significant costs.  
In order to avoid sanctions such as social exclusion, shame or embarrassment, group 
members are likely to regulate their emotions towards outsiders in order to conform to 
social expectations.  This kind of in-group policing is established through a range of socio-
psychological mechanisms, such as boundary activation, outgroup negativity or 
delegitimization of the other, outgroup homogenization, ingroup solidarity/cohesion and 
positive self-image (McDoom 2012: 122-3; see Bar-Tal 2013: 25, 175-6).  These mechanisms 
are likely to be triggered in the face of material or symbolic threats.  The greater the 
perception of threat, the greater the need for in-group loyalty and therefore, the higher the 
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cost for transgressing collective norms, beliefs and narratives.  What is at stake in the 
argument which follows is what these costs may look like and how they pose obstacles to 
effective and sustainable conflict transformation.     
 The ways in which the socio-psychological infrastructure in Israel and Palestine is 
strengthened are considerable, including: extensive sharing of the beliefs and accompanying 
emotions widely held by members of society (individuals are socialized with these from an 
early age); wide and active application of their daily use in individuals’ lives through public 
discourse, social media and mass communication, through oral history, through national-
religious ceremonies, commemoration, rituals, and symbols; a widespread presence in 
cultural media, and their frequent appearance in educational materials (Bar-Tal 2007: 1445; 
Bar-Tal 1998; Pappe 2010; Peled-Elhanan 2012; Bar-On 2001; Caspi and Rubenstein 2012).  
Extending this line of argument in another context, the socio-psychological infrastructure 
which shapes the dominant terrorism discourse has similarly been maintained by ‘a large 
assortment of social institutions (the media, academia, security agencies, legal entities, 
political actors, and so on), an ever-growing set of material and discursive practices of 
security and control…and a vast array of cultural productions (films, novels, academic 
outputs, newspaper articles, official reports, laws, regulations, jokes, Web sites, comics, art, 
theater, and so on)’ (Jackson 2015: 2).  Where the socio-psychological infrastructure 
supporting a conflict narrative has been successfully institutionalised, the cost of empathy 
with members of the out-group is likely to be higher (and the rewards for in-group loyalty 
correspondingly significant).  Empathy is costly, therefore, because power operates through 
social identities and group dynamics in such a way that it is psychologically and politically 
difficult for people to empathize with outsiders.   
The more effective the socio-psychological infrastructure is, the more challenging it 
is for individuals who seek to identify with and voice alternative narratives.  As Jackson 
highlights in his discussion of terrorism mythography, when faced with ‘“the dilemma that 
the serious novelist shares with the ethnographer – the need to empathize with one’s 
subject in order to be true to their tale”, the terrorism novelist is bound to conform to the 
dictates of the [contemporary cultural and political] taboo and avoid at all costs “talking to 
terrorists”’ (2015: 8).  Moreover, Sonnenschein noted in a further illustration of socio-
psychological control mechanisms that research has shown that ‘when there is a peak in the 
conflict our [Israeli] journalists forget their professional identity and stick to their national 
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identity.  They speak the voice of the government’ (Interview, 2014).  Reinforcing these 
patterns, escalations of violence or crisis points allow ‘chosen traumas’ embedded in the 
master narrative to be reactivated in the face of more recent traumatic events and the 
associated emotions (grief, loss, anger, fear, resentment, hate) and beliefs drawn upon in 
order to ensure the support of in-group members for the current crisis whilst at the same 
time further delegitimizing the opponent or out-group (Volkan cited in Bar-Tal 2013: 146).  
The master narratives in Israel and Palestine demonstrate the ongoing role of the Nakba and 
the Holocaust as chosen traumas of the Palestinians and Israelis respectively.13  Where such 
traumas – both historical and contemporary - have been deeply written into the emotional 
fabric of collective memory and political community, they tend to generate narrow and 
fearful definitions of security and, consequently, to reinforce antagonistic political relations.  
The activation of socio-psychological mechanisms through narrated trauma engenders 
further barriers to empathy as the difficulty in challenging the collective narrative increases 
along with the pressure to remain loyal to the in-group. 
The socio-psychological infrastructure effectively reveals considerable political and 
psychological obstacles to empathy.  When the norms, narratives, identities, emotions and 
beliefs of groups/societies are transgressed by empathy entrepreneurs, I argue that there 
are often considerable costs to engaging in empathy.  Developed as a typology in order to 
capture multiple dimensions, the table below identifies five types of cost: epistemological; 
cognitive; emotional; material, and embodied.14  The typology not only allows the 
identification of the specific costs across multiple dimensions of individual experience but it 
enables direct and indirect relations of power to be traced within and between societies. 
 
Types of Cost Forms of expression (examples) 
Epistemological Positions of hierarchy 
Voices of authority/‘expert’ knowledge 
Objectivity 
Limits of knowledge 
                                                          
13
 Four key themes are identified by Hammack (2011) in the master narrative of Jewish-Israeli identity. These 
are: 1) historical persecution and victimization of the Jews; 2) existential insecurity; 3) the exceptionalism of 
Jewish Israelis; and, 4) the delegitimization of the Palestinians which, at the extreme end of the spectrum, is 
characterised by a denial of an indigenous Palestinian identity (2011: 117. Similarly, Hammack identifies four 
central themes in the master narrative of Palestinian identity: 1) the experience of loss and land dispossession; 
2) resistance as a consequence of the perceived injustice of this loss; 3) existential insecurity in terms of 
identity and everyday life in Palestine; and, 4) the delegitimization of Israeli identity (2011: 160-1). 
14
 Neither the types nor the examples provided of these costs are claimed to be exhaustive.   
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Cognitive Alienation from in-group/collective 
narrative 
Rupture or disintegration of individual and 
collective identities 
Cognitive dissonance 
Re-constitution of beliefs, values, identity 
Emotional Loneliness/rejection 
Social reprobation/social exclusion 
Confusion/uncertainty 
Guilt 
Shame 
Fear 
Anger 
Emotional dissonance 
Material Threat of or loss of job security/career 
prospects 
Loss of power/influence 
Harm to reputation/status 
Physical violence 
Intimidation 
Embodied Sweating 
Sleeplessness 
Discomfort 
Vulnerability 
Tears 
Fatigue 
 
Feminist theorists have theorised empathy as an intersubjective epistemology, which 
moves away from the notion of the autonomous or universal subject (Hemmings 2011; 
Collins 2000; Sylvester 1994).  It is, they suggest, one way of mitigating the forms of 
representational violence often done through an absence of empathy for the knowledge 
and experience of the other subject (Hemmings 2011: 201).  While not unproblematic, 
feminist thought highlights an important epistemological point: engaging in empathy may 
represent a cost in relation to positions and voices of authority, ‘expert knowledge’, and 
established intellectual and institutional hierarchies.  Empathy requires of its participants – 
whatever their professional status, class, race, or gender – an openness and vulnerability to 
the ontological and epistemological knowledge of the ‘other’.  Such openness may disrupt 
dominant modes of thinking and feeling as it encounters marginalised identities, forms of 
knowledge, and subaltern narratives.   
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While this is by no means necessarily a cost – indeed many would argue it is an 
asset! – it nonetheless runs counter to an objective or positivist epistemology that has long 
dominated international relations and political science.  Questioning the authority of the 
speaking or writing academic subject, Jackson argues that ‘the professional academic voice 
is strictly limited in its capacity to convey some realities, some knowledge, some voices’ 
(2015: 13; Dauphinee 2010).  Rejecting a clear divide between affective and cognitive modes 
of empathy also serves to challenge the rationalist paradigm which pre-determines what 
forms of ‘knowing’ are possible.  Clare Hemmings articulates the empathetic critique of 
epistemology in two ways; first as recognition of ‘feeling as knowing’, which draws attention 
to ‘the importance of the researcher or knower as embodied rather than abstracted’, and 
second, ‘the importance of moving beyond the subject and towards intersubjective 
practices and modes of knowing’ (2011: 198).  Christine Sylvester’s feminist epistemology 
supports this reading as she argues that ‘empathetic cooperation [offers] a navigational 
method of politics at borderlands’ through which ‘our subjectivities travel to accommodate 
the new empathies’ (1994: 326).  Drawing on María Lugones’ notion of “world”-travelling 
(1987), Sylvester’s writing emphasises both the uncertainties around knowledge, affect, 
identity, and subjectivity which empathy may produce and the capacity for empathy and 
cooperation to enable ‘different worlds and ourselves within them’ (1994: 326, citing 
Lugones).  Such subjective shifts are likely to unsettle established ideas of self and other. 
This epistemological perspective confronts a criticism often voiced amongst 
recipients of aid and peace-building programmes: the authority and knowledge of the 
‘expert’ aid worker or peacebuilder.  Séverine Autesserre highlights the perception of locals 
that foreign peacebuilders impose their outside knowledge ‘in a manner both disrespectful 
and humiliating’ (2014: 103).  Reminiscent of colonial structures of power, the perception is 
that the foreign interveners “know what is best for local people” (2014: 202).  Autessere 
elucidates the structures of inequality that permeate international peacebuilding and the 
hierarchies established between locals and foreign peacebuilders.  The altruistic narrative of 
being “here to help”, adopted by the interveners, enables claims to moral superiority, 
greater expertise, authority, and greater social capital (2014: 195).  Autessere elaborates 
this imbalance of power in an interview conducted with an experienced peacebuilder:  
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No matter how hard Larke and his colleagues tried to use “the most 
empowering methodologies,” the “classic, almost paternalist thinking” that 
permeates aid efforts “crept into the psychology of everyone”.  To Larke, this 
patronizing attitude was rooted in the very fact of being “brought in from the 
outside with the idea that we are here to help – that people are needy and 
lack capacity” (2014: 198). 
 
Discounting the knowledge of local people often leads to the pejorative ‘othering’ of these 
communities as well.  Under such circumstances, the disruptions and shifts implied by 
epistemological costs of empathy are unlikely to unfold.  The epistemological cost of 
empathy not only underpins the other dimensions of cost in that it represents an individual 
intellectual, emotional or embodied journey, but it also represents a call for caution to 
practitioners, peacebuilders, politicians, policy-makers and researchers who represent the 
knowledge and experience of the other without having undergone the discomfort of 
travelling towards them, their knowledge, and their worlds.  As such, it poses challenges for 
the frequently hierarchical structures of international conflict resolution, peacebuilding, and 
policy-making, placing the knowledge and experience of those affected at the core of such 
work and opening up conversations about (il)legitimate forms of knowledge and their 
expression. 
I argued above that cognition and emotion should be treated as mutually 
constitutive of empathic processes; while an analytical distinction is helpful for the purposes 
of the typology, empirically separating these intertwined processes is rarely possible.  
Alienation from one’s own collective narrative is likely, for example, to both evoke and be 
constituted by emotions of sadness, anger, guilt, shame, and loneliness.  Similarly, the 
deconstruction and reconstruction of individual or collective beliefs and identities is likely to 
be accompanied by a range of emotions.  This process of alienation emerges from a 
dissonance between the socially expected emotions, beliefs or identity – feeling rules - 
which are institutionalised in the socio-psychological infrastructure, and the actually 
experienced emotions, beliefs, shifts in values, and so on.  Drawing on experiences from 
Israel and Palestine, the illustrations of a micro-politics of empathy that follow do not 
adhere strictly to a single type of cost but instead demonstrate these interwoven types as 
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consequences of in-group policing dynamics enabled through the framework of the socio-
psychological infrastructure.15   
As the stronger party in an asymmetrical conflict, for some Israelis the most 
significant cost of engaging in empathy is often a sense of isolation or alienation from the 
dominant cultural and political Israeli master narrative and the consequent forms of identity 
disruption or cognitive dissonance which this causes.16  The choice to become involved in 
transformative dialogue work is not a trivial one and may invoke a social, emotional, and 
material price; being defined as someone who engages with or loves the ‘enemy other’ ‘may 
close certain social circles, options and contacts for the facilitator who may face rejection 
and exclusion from those who object to Jewish-Palestinian partnership’ (Maoz, Bekerman, 
Getz Sheftel 2007: 40).  Yiftach Ron and Ifat Maoz have written that ‘Israeli Jews who have 
experienced such transformative encounters often find relating to wider Jewish Israeli 
society more difficult, reporting loneliness and even reprobation, particularly in times of war 
or crisis […] They are alienated from the Jewish-Israeli collective ethos and the conflict-
supporting master narrative’ (2013: 290).17  This cognitive and emotional cost was 
expressed through acknowledgement that encounters with Palestinians and political 
positions which challenged the Jewish-Israeli master narrative had led to accusations of 
betrayal or being a ‘traitor’ by groups within their own communities (Interview with Gvirtz, 
2014).18  This serves as a kind of threat, a form of in-group policing, which says that ‘we do 
not want you as a part of our society’ (Interview with Gvirtz, 2014). 
A key cost of engaging in empathy with the Israeli other for Palestinians includes 
accusations of normalization which is one of most powerful narratives within the 
contemporary Palestinian political climate and which, at times, imposes a form of ‘identity 
                                                          
15
 Recognising the role played by in-group dynamics is not intended to deny the plurality of internal group 
dynamics, narratives, and beliefs in Israeli or Palestinian society but rather to highlight the psychological 
function of groups. 
16
 Jackson also recognises the dissonance caused by empathy through fiction: ‘I wanted the affective qualities 
of the narrative to challenge the reader to re-evaluate and rethink their attitudes and beliefs about the 
motives of a terrorist and the nature of terrorism, in large part by humanizing the “terrorist” and generating a 
kind of dissonance – causing empathy with his life story, grievances, and aims (if not his methods)’ (2015: 14, 
emphasis added). 
17
 There is a risk that if over-generalised this assumption may veil the recognition of extant alternative minority 
narratives within the Israeli public sphere.  In so doing it would risk representing a dialogue around the ‘costs’ 
of empathy in terms which grant too much significance to the structures of the state and the socio-
psychological infrastructure and insufficient importance to agency and counter-narratives, articulated through 
the myriad acts of resistance or transformation which are present within Israeli and Palestinian societies. 
18
 Other Palestinian and Israeli NGO leaders interviewed also reported similar issues (2014). 
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policing’ (Abu Nimer and Lazarus 2007:22; Interviews with Helou, Dajani, 2014).  An 
example of this is the experience of Professor Mohammed Dajani, formerly head of the 
American Studies Department at Al Quds University until his resignation in June 2014, who 
took a group of twenty-seven Palestinians students to visit Auschwitz as part of an 
educational experience designed to develop understanding of the Holocaust and to teach 
tolerance and empathy.   The project, “Hearts of Flesh – Not Stone” was organized by the 
Friedrich Schiller University in Jena, Germany and funded by the German Research 
Foundation.  As part of the same project, Israeli students from Ben-Gurion University of the 
Negev also visited the Dheishe refugee camp in Bethlehem to learn about the Nakba.  
Following the trip, Professor Dajani resigned as the result of a months-long campaign of 
threats, intimidation and extreme criticism within the Palestinian media and wider 
community (Kalman 2014; Lazareva 2014; Black 2014; Booth 2014).  Dajani identifies 
multiple types of cost, notably material and emotional, as the price for engaging in empathy 
as a practice of resistance to both the Israeli occupation and to the Palestinian collective 
narrative around normalisation:  
 
There have been very personal attacks against me and all my academic career 
has been wiped out and all my accomplishments in the service of the 
Palestinian cause has been crossed out and I have been labelled…a traitor and 
I am betraying the cause. …And then there are threats against my 
life…instead of this trip becoming an educational trip for students who have 
been raised up…in an environment of ignorance and an environment of denial 
of the Holocaust…an educational trip becomes a political trip, and I personally 
become a target, not only in terms of labelling and character assassination 
but also in terms of personal safety and personal security (Interview 2014). 
 
Dajani considered that these attacks were intended to close down the political space for 
dialogue and alternative political futures.  Here we see ways in which in-group policing has 
functioned to generate particular costs to engaging in empathy.  Such dynamics, Dajani 
indicates, are intended to prevent deviation from the Palestinian dominant narrative around 
normalization and to prevent the development of reconciliation processes between Israelis 
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and Palestinians, thus affecting not just individuals but also national and international 
political processes: 
 
I think the idea is to terrorise professors and teachers and intellectuals … If 
you break from that collective version that has in the last sixty years caused 
us one disaster after another, and made us lose one opportunity after the 
other, making us only get deeper and deeper in the abyss then you have 
either to listen … to their way of thinking or you are a traitor to their cause 
(Interview 2014). 
 
Dajani’s experience clearly underlines the argument that contesting the Palestinian 
narrative of anti-normalisation by facilitating empathic relations with Israelis is associated 
with particular types of costs.  Imposing such costs through in-group policing maintains the 
particular collective narratives and emotional orientations that underpin the ethos of 
conflict and the political status quo. 
Similar issues were faced by participants in the Peace Research Institute in the 
Middle East (PRIME) dual narrative project which brought Israeli and Palestinian teachers 
together between 2002 and 2009 to develop and teach a history text comprising of two, 
parallel, narratives for events across the last century for two nations.   Some Palestinian 
teachers faced pressure not to participate from anti-normalisation critics and those who 
sought to bring the dual narrative approach into their classrooms were not permitted to do 
so (Interview with Naveh, 2014). Israeli participants who sought to adopt the dual narrative 
approach in their classroom were subject to formal cautions by the Israeli Ministry of 
Education (Interview with Naveh, 2014). Such consequences represent material costs in 
terms of job security as well as the cognitive and emotional costs triggered by perceptions 
of threat, fear, and vulnerability. 
Further cognitive and emotional costs are encountered by individuals – including 
Dajani’s students - when we consider the dissonance created by the transition from the 
equality of the safe space of the face-to-face encounter in dialogue workshops to the 
ongoing (and asymmetrical) reality met with by both Jewish Israelis and Palestinians in the 
social and political world (Interview with Palestinian East Jerusalemite, 2013; Hammack 
2011: 312).  This involves the psychological experience of having one’s salient social identity 
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challenged within the construct of the workshop, peace camp, or program, only to return 
home and re-encounter the narrative of the other either directly or indirectly (through the 
perceptions of others) as a threat to one’s identity.  Both Palestinians and Israelis 
acknowledged encountering a lack of understanding, resentment, criticism, and charges of 
normalisation from family and friends which not infrequently resulted in participation in 
such encounters remaining hidden from their own communities (Interviews with Kalifon, 
2014, Helou, 2014, Naveh, 2014, Israeli NGO leader, 2014).  Such informal forms of pressure 
reflect the dominant narratives and the ethos of conflict in both societies.  The degree of 
cognitive and emotional dissonance that this may create, as the result of the disruption of 
the master narrative, speaks to the efficacy of the socio-psychological infrastructure and the 
difficulties of transgressing the societal beliefs of the in-group.19 
Another example of the costly nature of empathy emerges in the intergroup work of 
the School for Peace between Israelis and Palestinians.  Recounted in the analysis of 
Sonnenschein et al (2010), a dialogue encounter by Israelis with a Palestinian group of 
participants with a strong sense of their own identity posed significant epistemological, 
cognitive and emotional disruption to the Israeli Jewish image of themselves, their image of 
the Palestinian other, as well as the coherence and perceived superiority of their collective 
identity, knowledge, and narrative.  Sonnenschein et al write:  
 
They [the Jewish group] felt that the information presented by the Palestinian 
group contradicted their positive moral self-image and they felt that their self-
image was threatened. […] Thus, this stage of the process is characterised by 
internal emotional turmoil, featuring confusion, uneasiness, and pangs of 
conscience.  Self-respect is eroded as the collective moral self-image 
deteriorates (2010: 55). 
 
Underpinning the emotional and cognitive dissonance articulated in this example is the 
epistemological challenge posed by the encounter to the authority and knowledge of the 
Jewish-Israeli narrative. 
                                                          
19
 It is not difficult to imagine such dissonance also encountered in the international realm by diplomats or 
negotiators in situations of conflict. 
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While Bar-Tal suggests a number of formal control mechanisms exercised by the 
state which serve to consolidate and embed these collective narratives and beliefs, he also 
recognises that informal forms of pressure to conform may also be exercised by individual 
members against those who seek to believe or present information which contradicts the 
dominant socio-psychological repertoire of conflict (2007: 1445).  The preceding examples 
have highlighted a number of ways in which these informal forms of pressure function.  
Further evidence of formal and informal socio-psychological mechanisms emerged in the 
public debate over the condemnation of Israeli Jews who voiced empathy for Gazans in the 
July-August 2014 war or who went further and opposed the war and Israeli policy.  Such 
expressions were largely deemed illegitimate by both the wider public on social media sites 
and by socially privileged actors such as government ministers, politicians, and university 
administrations in public statements, as they challenged the dominant Jewish-Israeli 
narrative, the collective emotional orientation of Jewish-Israeli society and the ethos of 
conflict which was strengthened in a time of crisis.  The social and political status of many of 
these actors ensured that certain empathic narratives – and their speakers - have been 
marginalised.  Encountering multiple types of costs – cognitive, emotional, material and 
embodied - through the dynamics of in-group policing, those uttering them have been 
intimidated, accused of betrayal, treason, being anti-Israel, socially alienated, and the 
victims of violence and incitements to violence.  They have risked loss of status, reputation, 
and influence within their own communities (Hari 2010; Levy and Levac 2014; Prusher 2014; 
Arad 2014; Pappe 2010; Carlstrom 2014; Fraser 2014; Ronen 2014; Kashti 2014).  When 
undertaken through overtly political channels activities expressing empathy have also led to 
monitoring and questioning by the Israeli security services (Hass 2010). 
Last but not least, I want to turn to the reflections of Zoughbi Zoughbi, Director of 
the Wi’am Center in Bethlehem, whose words highlight how empathy may be mapped onto 
the body: 
It’s really a process.  It needs to be sweating, it needs to be armed from your 
toe to your head with morals.  It needs to be worked with conscious[ness] 
and conscience.  It needs a kind of evaluation of yourself – read the history of 
yourself. …  It needs sleeplessness at night. … It’s not easy, even on the daily 
level (Interview 2014). 
 
23 
 
This embodied dimension of empathy is deeply evocative and it highlights the need for 
further research on the embodied issues surrounding empathy conceptualised as a costly 
encounter.  Building on Lugones’ writings, Hemmings highlights the importance of 
‘discomfort’ in the process of ‘travelling towards the other’ (2011: 200).  This bodily 
discomfort is also traceable through the previous illustrations of material, emotional and 
cognitive costs.  While psychological and phenomenological approaches have engaged with 
embodied empathy, this has largely been done in the context of the relational experience 
between the self and the other.  As such the question of intersubjectivity focuses on the 
different levels of connecting and merging with the other’s bodily experience (Finlay 2005; 
Dekeyser, Elliott, Leijssen 2009).  Indeed, Maurice Merleau-Ponty argued that ‘it is precisely 
my body which perceives the body of another person’ (cited in Finlay 2005: 276).  This focus, 
whilst important for empathy, does not attend to the embodied experience of the self.  
Here it is not so much the listener’s appreciation of or ability to connect with the embodied 
experience of the other (a core element of psychotherapy and Rogerian counseling) that is 
at stake but rather the meaning attributed to these embodied experiences by those living 
them.  Clare Hemmings has referred to ways in which the ‘breakdown of empathy produces 
a crisis mediated instead by prioritizing “bodily knowledge” (2011:197).  While empathy 
triggers forms of bodily knowledge, this is not limited to the failures or the breakdown of 
empathy.  Indeed, I would suggest that forms of bodily knowledge may be an inherent 
dimension to all forms of empathy.  This remains an area for further research, yet it is likely 
that all forms of empathy will write itself on the body in both physiological and 
psychological terms. 
Conclusions 
Whilst exposure to contested and disruptive narratives of the other may serve to trigger a 
re-examination of the language and terminology used by all parties to conflict, limit moral 
exclusion and elicit greater moral concern through the reconstruction of one’s social 
identity, empathy - to ‘walk a few miles in the shoes of the other’ - is a demanding 
psychological and embodied experience which has the potential to trigger the disruption of 
one’s identity in multiple ways.  Drawing on a range of empirical examples from Israel and 
Palestine, I have sought to demonstrate how the socio-psychological infrastructure of 
societies in conflict creates significant costs to engaging in empathy.  Group dynamics and 
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social identities function in ways that make it both politically and psychologically difficult for 
individuals or groups to empathise with outsiders and, in particular, those portrayed 
historically and discursively as ‘enemies’.  The stronger the socio-psychological 
infrastructure is the higher the costs may be for empathy entrepreneurs.   
More broadly in international politics, the macro-level socio-psychological 
infrastructure sets the background against which empathic behaviour may exact costs at a 
micro level.  The perpetuation of the collective emotional orientation, ethos of conflict, and 
collective memories at a micro-level through effective in-group policing in turn feeds the 
wider reinforcement and iteration of macro-discourses around conflict and security.  We 
can trace the relationship between the costs experienced at the micro-level by individuals to 
the continuation of broader policies, narratives, and beliefs which reinforce and perpetuate 
the conflict.  The development of the typology highlights not only the types of costs exacted 
from empathy entrepreneurs but raises broader questions around the production and 
maintenance of conflict in international politics through the acceptance or contestation of 
selected narratives of conflict by political elites.  Following the events of 9/11, former U.S. 
secretary of defense Robert McNamara and James Blight argued for 
 
The Empathy Imperative.  The West, led by the United States, must seek by all 
possible means to increase its understanding of the history, culture, religion, 
motives, and attitudes of those who have declared themselves to be its 
adversaries.  This effort should begin by developing empathy toward the 
Islamic fundamentalists, specifically those groups allied with, or sympathetic 
to, the international terrorist network known as al-Qaeda.  Empathy does not 
imply sympathy or agreement; it does imply curiosity, leading to deeper 
understanding of an adversary’s mindset, as a prerequisite to resolving 
differences and eliminating threats to peace and security (McNamara and 
Blight 2003: 234).   
 
The epistemological costs of empathy are of particular significance for policy-makers 
and political leaders as the forms and limits of knowledge they bring attention to pose a 
challenge to the hierarchies of political elites, to understandings of national interests and 
identity, to established relations of power and (in)equality, and to a reluctance to reveal 
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vulnerability or uncertainty within domestic or international politics.  As Maria Mälksoo 
writes, each state ‘wishes to secure its being as a certain sort of being; to guarantee its 
cohesiveness in order to reduce the fundamental unpredictability of the surrounding 
environment and its own vulnerability vis-à-vis other political actors’ (2015: 4).  The 
ontological security of states to which Mälksoo is referring is problematised by the 
epistemological costs of empathy.  Empathy unravels our established notions of security 
through understanding the histories, narratives, beliefs, and emotions of others.  Empathy 
exposes a need to reconfigure self-other relations more reflexively in international relations; 
it requires policy-makers to break habitual patterns of othering, to make space to reflect on 
the consequences of our actions and beliefs on others as well as the potential 
interpretations of our actions.   Empathy requires a willingness to engage with subaltern 
narratives and to unsettle the established representations of other states and collective 
actors.  If policy makers and practitioners are interested in making empathy work for peace, 
then more attention needs to be paid to both analysing potential costs in specific contexts 
of conflict and seeking to remove these barriers to empathy.  In addition, greater awareness 
of the potential costs of failing to empathise is required, as McNamara has cogently 
articulated in reflections on his experiences of war (McNamara and Blight 2003; Morris 
2003).  These empathic practices call for reflecting on the design and implementation of 
conflict interventions, peace-building programmes, and foreign policy by actors at both the 
macro and micro levels. 
That there remains room for optimism, however, can be seen in the micro-politics of 
many civil society organisations working in situations of violence that place empathy at their 
core.  Examples of such sites of hope in Israel and Palestine include the grassroots 
organisations, Parents Circle – Families Forum, Combatants for Peace, and the School for 
Peace (Neve Shalom-Wahat al-Salam) as well as myriad expressions of individual and 
collective empathy voiced during the Gaza 2014 war.  Hope, as defined by Halperin et al, can 
lead to ‘higher cognitive processing and requires setting goals [including yearning for relief 
from negative conditions]; planning how to achieve them; use of imagery, creativity, 
cognitive flexibility, mental exploration of novel situations, and even risk taking’ (2008: 235).  
Echoing a similar set of cognitive skills to empathy, hope as an emotion provides a 
counterweight to the costs through the creative and committed activities of organisations 
and individuals such as those mentioned above which can contribute to (an admittedly 
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marginalised) collective emotional orientation.  That empathy may be costly does not 
prevent agents – at grassroots or elite levels – identifying with counter-narratives that look 
for the transformation of conflict.  That this work often tugs against the tides of public 
opinion – and the socio-psychological infrastructure - is equally evident.  As Ted Hopf notes, 
any ‘efforts to change have first to overcome the power of habitual perceptions, emotions 
and practices’ (2010: 540).  Perhaps against the odds, empathy entrepreneurs – as agents of 
social and political change - develop modes of resistance to the individual and collective 
biases perpetuated by the socio-psychological infrastructure.  
 
 
Acknowledgements 
Thanks go to the Carnegie Trust for the Universities of Scotland for funding that supported 
this research and the Kenyon Institute for hosting my stay in Jerusalem.  Thanks for their 
insightful comments on earlier drafts go to Ty Solomon, Karin Fierke, Vivienne Matthies-
Boon, Katherine Allison, Volha Piotukh, David Traven, the participants at ECPR in Glasgow 
2014, and the members of the HINT cluster at the University of Glasgow and the ICCS in 
Birmingham where this paper was first presented.  I am grateful for the robust and 
constructive comments provided by three anonymous reviewers and the journal editors.   
 
References 
Aminzade, Ron and Doug McAdam. ‘Emotions and Contentious Politics’, in Ronald R. 
Aminzade, Jack A. Goldstone, Doug McAdam, Elizabeth J. Perry, William H. Sewell, Jr., Sidney 
Tarrow, Charles Tilly, Silence and Voice in the Study of Contentious Politics, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001) 
 
Abu Nimer, Mohammed and Ned Lazarus. ‘The Peacebuilder’s Paradox and the Dynamics of 
Dialogue: A Psychosocial Portrait of Israeli-Palestinian Encounter’, in Judy Kuriansky (ed.), 
Beyond Bullets and Bombs: Grassroots Peacebuilding between Israelis and Palestinians 
(Westport: Praeger 2007) 
 
Appiah, Kwame Anthony. Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers, (New York: W. 
W. Norton, 2006) 
 
Arad, Dafna.  ‘Israeli artists opposing the war come under attack on social media networks’, 
Haaretz, 22 July 2014: http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-
1.606482 (accessed 22 July 2014) 
 
27 
 
Autesserre, Séverine. Peaceland: Conflict Resolution and the Everyday Politics of 
International Intervention, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014) 
 
Bar-On, Daniel. ‘The Silence of Psychologists’, Political Psychology, 22(2), 2001, pp.331-345 
 
Bar-Tal, Daniel. ‘The Rocky Road Toward Peace: Beliefs on Conflict in Israeli Textbooks’, 
Journal of Peace Research, 35(6), 1998, pp. 723-42. 
 
Bar-Tal, Daniel. ‘Sociopsychological Foundations of Intractable Conflicts’, American 
Behavioral Scientist, 50(11), 2007, pp.1430-1453 
 
Bar-Tal, Daniel, Neta Oren, Rafi Nets-Zehngut. ‘Sociopsychological analysis of conflict-
supporting narratives: A general framework’, Journal of Peace Research, 51(5), 2014, 
pp.662-675 
 
Bar-Tal, Daniel. Intractable Conflicts: Socio-Psychological Foundations and Dynamics, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) 
 
Baron-Cohen, Simon. Zero Degrees of Empathy, (London: Penguin, 2011) 
  
Batson, C. D. and Nadia Ahmad.  ‘Using Empathy to Improve Intergroup Attitudes and 
Relations’, Social Issues and Policy Review, 3(1), 2009, pp.141-177 
 
Black, Ian. ‘Palestinian professor: no regrets over taking students to Auschwitz’, The 
Guardian, 13 June 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/13/palestinian-
professor-resigns-students-auschwitz 
 
Bleiker, Roland and Emma Hutchison.  ‘Fear no more: emotions and world politics’, Review 
of International Studies, 34, 2008, pp.115-35 
 
Booth, William. ‘Palestinian university students’ trip to Auschwitz causes uproar’, 
Washington Post, 12 April 2014 
 
Broome, Benjamin J. ‘Managing differences in conflict resolution: the role of relational 
empathy’, in Dennis J. D. Sandole and Hugo van der Merwe (eds.), Conflict Resolution Theory 
and Practice, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993) 
 
Cameron, Lynne and Simon Weatherbed. Empathy Dynamic in Conflict Transformation: A 
Manual, (Open University/ESRC: 2014) 
 
Carlstrom, Gregg. ‘The Death of Sympathy: How Israeli hawks intimidated and silenced the 
last remnants of the anti-war left’, Foreign Policy, 5 August 2014 
 
Caspi, Dan and Danny Rubenstein. ‘The Wallkeepers: Monitoring the Israeli-Arab Conflict’, in 
Daniel Bar-Tal and Izhak Schnell (eds.), The Impacts of Lasting Occupation: Lessons from 
Israeli Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 
 
28 
 
Collins, Patricia Hill. Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of 
Empowerment (2000) 
 
Crawford, Neta C. ‘The Passion of World Politics’, International Security, 24(4), 2000, pp.116-
56 
 
Crawford, Neta, C.  Argument and Change in World Politics: Ethics, Decolonization and 
Humanitarian Intervention, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) 
 
Crawford, Neta, C. ‘Emotions and international security: Cave! Hic Libido’, Critical Studies on 
Security, 1:1, 2013, pp.121-123 
 
Crawford, Neta, C. ‘Institutionalizing passion in world politics: fear and empathy’, 
International Theory, 6(3), 2014, pp.535-557 
 
Dauphinee, Elizabeth. ‘The ethics of autoethnography’, Review of International Studies, 
36(3), 2010, pp.799-818 
 
Dekeyser, Mathias, Robert Elliott, and Mia Leijssen. ‘Empathy in Pschotherapy: Dialogue and 
Embodied Understanding’, in Jean Decety and William Ickes (eds.).  The Social Neuroscience 
of Empathy (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2009) 
 
Demertzis, Nicolas. ‘Introduction: Theorizing the Emotions-Politics Nexus’, in Demertzis (ed.) 
Emotions in Politics: The Affect Dimension in Political Tension (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2013) 
 
Deutsch, Morton. ‘Justice and Conflict’, in Morton Deutsch, Peter T. Coleman and Eric C. 
Marcus (eds.), The Handbook of Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice, 2nd. Edn., (San 
Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2006) 
 
Elias, Juanita and Shiring Rai. ‘The Everday Gendered Political Economy of Violence’, Politics 
and Gender, 11(2), 2015, pp.424-429 
 
Fattah, Khaled and K. M. Fierke, ‘A Clash of Emotions: The Politics of Humiliation and 
Political Violence in the Middle East’, European Journal of International Relations, 15(1), 
2009, pp.67-93 
 
Finlay, Linda. ‘‘Reflexive Embodied Empathy’: A Phenomenology of Participant–Researcher 
Intersubjectivity’, The Humanistic Psychologist, 33(4), pp.271-292 
 
Fraser, Giles. ‘Against the war: the movement that dare not speak its name in Israel’, The 
Guardian, 7 August 2014 
 
Frevert, Ute.  Emotions in History: Lost and Found (Budapest: Central European University 
Press, 2011 
 
29 
 
Galtung, Johan: Transcend and Transform: An Introduction to Conflict Work (London: Pluto 
Press, 2004) 
 
Habermas, Jürgen and Peter Dews. Habermas: Autonomy and Solidarity, (London: Verso, 
1992) 
 
Halperin, E., K. Sharvit, and J. J. Gross. ‘Emotions and emotion regulation in conflicts’.  In 
Daniel Bar-Tal (ed.), Intergroup Conflicts and their resolution: A social psychological 
perspective, (New York: Psychology Press, 2011). 
 
Halperin, Eran, Daniel Bar-Tal, Rafi Nets-Zehngut and Erga Drori. ‘Emotions in Conflict: 
Correlates of Fear and Hope in the Israeli-Jewish Society’, Peace and Conflict: Journal of 
Peace Psychology, 14, 2008, pp.233-258 
 
Hammack, Phillip L. Narrative and the Politics of Identity: The Cultural Psychology of Israeli 
and Palestinian Youth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) 
 
Hari, Johann. ‘Is Gideon Levy the most hated man in Israel or just the most heroic?’ The 
Independent, 24 September 2010 
 
Hass, Amira.  ‘Conscientious Objector Yonatan Shapira Questioned by Shin Bet’, Haaretz, 20 
July 2010 
 
Hemmings, Clare.  Why Stories Matter: The Political Grammar of Feminist Theory (London: 
Duke University Press, 2011) 
 
Hemmings, Clare. ‘Affective solidarity: Feminist reflexivity and political transformation’, 
Feminist Theory, 12(2), 2012, pp. 147-161 
 
Holmes, Marcus. ‘The Force of Face-to-Face Diplomacy: Mirror Neurons and the Problem of 
Intentions’, International Organization, 67(4), 2013, pp 829-861 
 
Hopf, Ted. ‘The logic of habit in International Relations’, European Journal of International 
Relations, 16(4), 2010, pp.539-561 
 
Hutchison, Emma and Roland Bleiker, ‘Theorizing emotions in world politics’, International 
Theory, 6(3), 2014, pp.491-514 
 
Jackson, Richard. ‘Terrorism, Taboo, and Discursive Resistance: The Agonistic Potential of 
the Terrorism Novel’, International Studies Review, 2015 (online first), pp.1-18 
 
Kalman, Matthew. ‘Palestinan professor who took students to Auschwitz responds to 
threats’, Haaretz, 10 April 2014  
 
Kashti, Or. ‘Israeli university rebukes professor who expressed sympathy for both Israeli, 
Gazan victims’, Haaretz, 29 July 2014 
 
30 
 
Kelman, Herbert C. ‘Interactive Problem-Solving: Changing Political Culture in the Pursuit of 
Conflict Resolution’, Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 16, 2010, pp.389-413 
 
Kelman, Herbert C. ‘Social-Psychological Dimensions of International Conflict’, in I. William 
Zartman (ed.), Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques, (Washington 
D. C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2007) 
 
Kelman, Herbert C. ‘Transforming the Relationship between Former Enemies: A Social-
Psychological Analysis’, in R. L. Rothstein (ed.), After Peace: Resistance and Resilience, 
(London: Lynne Rienner, 1999) 
 
Kelman, Herbert C. ‘Negotiation as Interactive Problem Solving’, International Negotiation, 
1, 1996, pp.99-123 
 
Koehn, Daryl. Rethinking Feminist Ethics: care, trust and empathy, (London: Routledge, 
1998) 
 
Koschut, Simon.  ‘Emotional (security) communities: the significance of emotion norms in 
inter-allied conflict management’, Review of International Studies, 40(3), 2014, pp.533-558 
 
Krznaric, Roman. Empathy: A Handbook for Revolution, (Croydon: Random House, 2014) 
 
Lazareva, Inna. ‘Palestinian professor resigns over students’ trip to Auschwitz’, The 
Telegraph, 10 June 2014 
 
Levy, Gideon and Alex Levac. ‘Dark Days: Why Gideon Levy isn’t going back to Ashkelon 
anytime soon’, Haaretz, 19 July, 2014 
 
Linklater, Andrew. ‘Anger and World Politics: How Collective Emotions Shift Over Time’, 
International Theory, 6(3), 2014, pp.574–78 
 
Linklater, Andrew. Critical Theory and World Politics (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007) 
 
Lugones, Maria. ‘Playfulness, "World"-Travelling, and Loving Perception’, Hypatia, 2(2), 
1987, pp.3-19 
 
Mälksoo, Maria. ‘Memory must be defended’: Beyond the politics of mnemonical security’, 
Security Dialogue, 2015, pp.1-17 
 
Maoz, Ifat, Shoshana Steinberg, Dan Bar-On and Mueen Fakhereldeen. ‘The Dialogue 
between the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’: A Process Analysis of Palestinian-Jewish Encounters in 
Israel’, Human Relations, 55(8), 2002, pp. 931-962 
 
Maoz, Ifat, Zvi Bekerman, and Maya Getz Sheftel. ‘Can talking to each other really make a 
difference? Perspectives on reconciliation-aimed dialogues in the conflict between Israeli-
Jews and Palestinians’, in Judy Kuriansky (ed.) Beyond Bullets and Bombs: Grassroots 
Peacebuilding between Israelis and Palestinians (Westport: Praeger 2007) 
31 
 
Marlier, Grant and Neta C. Crawford. ‘Incomplete and Imperfect Institutionalization of 
Empathy and Altruism in the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ Doctrine’, Global Responsibility to 
Protect, 5, 2013, pp.397-422 
 
McDoom, Omar Shahabudin. ‘The psychology of threat in intergroup conflict: emotions, 
rationality, and opportunity in the Rwandan genocide’, International Security, 37 (2), 2012, 
pp. 119-155 
 
McNamara, Robert and James G. Blight. Wilson’s Ghost: Reducing the risk of conflict, killing, 
and catastrophe in the 21st century (2nd. ed.). (New York: Public Affairs, 2003) 
 
Monroe, Kirstin Renwick, Ethics in an Age of Terror and Genocide, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2012) 
 
Morrell, Michael E. Empathy and Democracy: Feeling, Thinking, and Deliberation, 
(Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010) 
 
Morris, Errol.  The fog of war: Eleven lessons from the life of Robert S. McNamara [Motion 
picture]. United States: Sony Pictures Classics, 2003 
 
Moses, Rafael. ‘Empathy and Dis-empathy in Political Conflict’, Political Psychology, 6(1), 
1985, pp.135-139 
 
Nussbaum, Martha.  Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001) 
 
Nussbaum, Martha, and Joshua Cohen (eds.). For Love of Country? (Boston: Beacon Press) 
2002 [1996] 
 
Obama, Barack. Remarks by President Obama in Address to the United Nations General 
Assembly, September 21, 2011, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2011/09/21/remarks-president-obama-address-united-nations-general-assembly 
 
Pappe, Ilan. Out of the Frame: The Struggle for Academic Freedom in Israel (London: Pluto 
Press, 2010) 
 
Pedwell, Carolyn. ‘Affective (self-)transformations: Empathy, neoliberalism and international 
development’, Feminist Theory, 13(2), 2012, pp.163-179 
 
Pedwell, Carolyn.  ‘Affect at the margins: Alternative empathies in ‘A Small Place’, Emotion, 
Space and Society, 8, 2013, pp.18-26 
 
Pedwell, Carolyn.  Affective Relations: The Transnational Politics of Empathy, (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2014) 
 
Peled-Elhanan, Nurit. Palestine in Israeli Schoolbooks: Ideology and Propaganda in Education 
(London: I. B. Tauris, 2012) 
32 
 
Prusher, Illene.  ‘In Israel or Gaza, declaring sympathy for the other side is a no-go zone’, 
Haaretz, 20 July 2014 
 
Reddy, William. ‘Historical Research on the Self and Emotions’, Emotion Review, 1(4), 2009, 
pp.302-315 
 
Rifkind, Gabrielle and Giandomenico Picco.  The Fog of Peace: The Human Face of Conflict 
Resolution (London: I. B. Tauris, 2014) 
 
Rifkin, Jeremy. The Empathic Civilization: The Race to Global Consciousness in a World in 
Crisis, (New York: Penguin, 2009) 
 
Ron, Yiftach and Ifat Maoz.  ‘Dangerous stories: Encountering narratives of the other in the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict’, Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 19(3), 2013, 
pp.281-294 
 
Ronen, Gil. ‘MK says Haaretz’s Levy is a traitor’, Israel National News, 3 August 2014, 
http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/183678#.VcDFnflwzTo  
 
Rothman, Jay. From Confrontation to Cooperation: Resolving Ethnic and Regional Conflict, 
(London: SAGE, 1992) 
 
Rouhana, Nadim N.  ‘Group Identity and Power Asymmetry in Reconciliation Processes: The 
Israeli–Palestinian Case’, Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 10(1), 2004, 
pp.33-52 
 
Ross, Andrew A. G.. Mixed Emotions: Beyond Fear and Hatred in International Conflict, 
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2014  
 
Saurette, Paul. ‘You dissin’ me? Humiliation and post 9/11 global politics’, Review of 
International Studies, 32(3), 2006, pp.495-522 
 
Siniver, Asaf. ‘Israeli Identities and the Politics of Threat: A Constructivist Interpretation’, 
Ethnopolitics, 11(1), 2012, pp.24-42 
 
Slote, Michael.  The Ethics of Care and Empathy (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007) 
 
Sonnenschein, Nava, Zvi Bekerman, Gabriel Horenczyk. ‘Threat and the Majority Identity’, 
Group Dynamics: Theory, Research, and Practice, 14(1), 2010, pp.47-65 
 
Staub, Ervin.  Overcoming Evil: Genocide, Violent Conflict, and Terrorism, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011) 
 
Sylvester, Christine. ‘Empathetic Cooperation: A Feminist Method for IR’, Millennium: 
Journal of International Studies, 23(2), 1994, pp.315-34 
 
33 
 
Von Scheve, Christian. ‘Emotion regulation and emotion work: two sides of the same coin?’ 
Frontiers in Psychology, 3, 2012, pp.1-10 
 
White, Ralph K. Fearful Warriors: A Psychological Profile of U.S.-Soviet Relations (New York: 
The Free Press, 1984) 
 
Yarhi-Milo, Karen. ‘Tying Hands Behind Closed Doors: The Logic and Practice of Secret 
Reassurance’, Security Studies, 22(3), 2013, pp.405-435 
 
Author interviews 
Interview with Palestinian East Jerusalemite, 6 September 2013  
Interview with Nava Sonnenschein, Director of Neve Shalom–Wahat al-Salam (School for 
Peace), 4 May 2014   
Interview with Zoughbi Zoughbi, Director of the Wi’am Center for Conflict Resolution, 5 May 
2014   
Interview with Eyal Naveh, Tel Aviv University, 20 May 2014   
Interview with Amos Gvirtz, Activist, Kibbutz Shefayim, 14 May 2014 
Interview with Yovav Kalifon, Tiyul Rihla, 9 May, 2014 
Interview with Israeli NGO leader, 9 May 2014 
Interview with Ina Friedman, MachsomWatch, 13 May 2014 
Interview with Ahmed Helou, Tiyul Rihla, 19 May 2014 
Interview with Mohammed Dajani, Wasatia, 21 May 2014 
